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Abstract
We derive a simple formula for the social discount rate (SDR) that uses the
median, rather than average agent of the economy to reflect the consequences of
consumption growth on income inequality. Under reasonable assumptions, the dif-
ference between the growth of median and mean incomes is used to adjust the
wealth-effect in the standard Ramsey rule. In a plausible special case the repres-
entative agent has the median income. With inequality aversion elasticity of 2 (1.5,
1), the U.K. and U.S. SDR would be 1% (0.5%, 0.25%) lower than the standard
Ramsey rule. This reflects two decades of inequality-increasing growth and implies
greater weight placed on future generations in public appraisal.
JEL Classification: D31, D61, H43.
Keywords: Social Discount Rate, Income Inequality, Inequality Aversion, Cost
Benefit Analysis
1 Introduction
The importance of income and consumption inequality has received great attention in the
political and scientific debate in recent years (see for instance Stiglitz, 2012; Piketty, 2014),
and its influence on public policy decisions is ongoing (Cingano, 2014). In this paper,
we study the impact of inequality for long-term public policy evaluations by deriving a
simple ‘inequality-adjusted’ social discount rate (SDR) for Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)
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that takes into account the dynamics of income inequality. Under assumptions typically
used in applied social discounting, the inequality-adjustment stems from an adjusted
consumption growth rate, which uses the difference between growth in median and per
capita incomes to reflect the distributional consequences of growth. This results in an
inequality-adjusted wealth-effect in the standard Ramsey rule. Our SDR is a special case
of previous work by Gollier (2015) and Emmerling (2011), and allows recent concerns
about income inequality to be simply incorporated into the analysis of public projects
through the discount rate.
Our inequality-adjusted SDR corresponds closely to current discounting practices and is
easily operationalised since it only requires knowledge of the growth of median income.
Indeed, a plausible special case defines the median agent of the income distribution as
the representative agent. This corresponds to recent proposals to count inequality among
the measures used to evaluate economic performance (Piketty, 2014; Aghion et al., 2013;
OECD, 2017). Growth of median income is argued to better reflect the performance of
society as a whole given its central location in the income distribution, whereas per-capita
income growth is skewed by growth among the rich (ONS, 2016). For this reason data
on the growth of median incomes are now routinely collected by government statistical
agencies and international organizations. For instance, in 2013, global annual household
income before taxes was $9,733, while median income was just $2,920, reflecting very dif-
ferent trajectories (Gallup, 2013). The inequality-adjusted SDR captures these disparities
and is amenable to policy-makers. Our recommendations speak to recent policy debates
where the choice of discount rate is pivotal, such as the analysis of climate change, nat-
ural capital valuation (Fenichel et al., 2016, 2017) and the appraisal of nuclear power.
Notably, worsening inequality over time implies a lower discount rate, which increases the
weight of future generations. Moreover, we provide an analytical foundation for replacing
the representative agent by the median of the distribution, based on intergenerational
distributional concerns, like those found in Andrews et al. (2017).
2 Discounting and the inquality-adjusted wealth ef-
fect
Assume an economy with a continuum of agents of type θ with cumulative distribution
function H (θ) , whose (unique) instantaneous felicity function is given by U (ct (θ)) , where
ct (θ) is consumption of type θ at time t. All agents have the same pure rate of time prefer-
ence δ. Using the standard expected utility framework, and due to the interchangeability
of the orders of integration, inter-temporal well-being can be represented by the following
social welfare function (SWF) (see also Gollier, 2015):
W0 =
∑
t=0
exp (−δt)E
∫
θ
U (ct (θ)) dH (θ) (1)
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At a given point in time, we can use Atkinson (1970)’s concept of the equally distributed
equivalent (EDE) level of consumption to rewrite this SWF: the EDE level of consumption
at time t is defined as:
cedet = U
−1
(∫
θ
U (ct (θ)) dH (θ)
)
(2)
which clearly depends on the characteristics of U (c), in particular aversion to inequality.
The SWF can now be re-written simply as:
W0 =
∑
t=0
exp (−δt)EU (cedet ) (3)
We abstract from uncertainty and take the deterministic case: future consumption is
certain, and assume that the costs and benefits of the public project are shared equally
among the individuals of the economy. This is a natural assumption for the derivation of
the discount rate, which focusses on the marginal impact of a policy on the population
holding the income (or consumption 1) distribution constant.2 The standard derivation
of the social discount rate then yields an inequality-adjusted SDR (Dasgupta (e.g., 2008,
p 150)):
r∗ = δ + ηgedet (4)
where η ≡ −c
ede
t U
′′(cedet )
U ′(cedet )
is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption,
and gedet =
1
t
log(cedet /c
ede
0 ) the annualized growth rate of EDE consumption between time
0 and t. The inequality-adjusted wealth-effect is given by the term ηgedet . The standard
Ramsey rule on the other hand is defined as r′ = δ + ηgpct , where g
pc
t is the growth of
per capita consumption, and ηgpct the wealth-effect. The difference between this and (4)
depends therefore on the different wealth-effects, which we analyse in detail in the next
section.
3 Discounting with representative median growth
Two commonplace assumptions, one theoretical and one empirical, lead to the simple
inequality-adjusted SDR which is a special case of Gollier (2015) and Emmerling (2011).
Assumption 1 is a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function: U (ct) =
1Note that in this paper we consider both distributions as equivalent, rationalizable for instance
through a homogeneous savings rate.
2In the risk domain the equivalent assumption would be that the project does not affect the probability
distribution of potential outcomes.
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(1− η)−1 ct1−η. Assumption 2 is log-normally distributed consumption: ct (θ) ∼ LN (µt, σ2t ) .
Assumption 1 is commonplace in applied theory and appears in practical applications of
the Ramsey Rule (e.g., Arrow et al., 2014). Assumption 2 is strongly supported by
empirical evidence (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i Martin, 2009). These assumptions lead to a
convenient form for the EDE level of consumption.
The kth raw moment of the log-normally distributed variable x (mean µ and variance σ2)
is given by E
[
xk
]
= exp (kµ+ 0.5k2σ2). Therefore, if income at time t is log-normally
distributed and preferences are CRRA, the EDE consumption level3, cedet , is:
cedet = exp
(
µt + 0.5 (1− η)σ2t
)
(5)
This can be compared to average, per-capita consumption, cpct = exp (µt + 0.5σ
2
t ) and
median consumption, cmedt = exp (µt). The closed form expression for c
ede
t leads to an
expression for its annualized growth, gedet :
gedet =
1
t
(µt − µ0) + 1
t
(
0.5 (1− η) ∆σ20,t
)
, (6)
where ∆σ20,t = σ
2
t −σ20 represents the change in the variance of log-consumption from time
0 to t. This growth rate can be compared with annualized average (per-capita) growth
rate:
gpct =
1
t
(µt − µ0) + 1
t
(
0.5∆σ20,t
)
(7)
and the annualized growth rate of median consumption:
gmedt =
1
t
(µt − µ0) . (8)
Our main result is as follows. Combining the growth equations (6),(7) and (8), yields
a simple expression for EDE growth in terms of inequality aversion, η, and mean and
median growth:
gedet = g
pc
t + η
(
gmedt − gpct
)
(9)
This is an inequality-adjusted growth rate, where the Atkinson index is the measure of
inequality considered. This follows because under Assumption 1 the Atkinson index is
monotonic in σ20,t, so ∆σ
2
0,t is synonymous with changes in inequality.
4 Under Assumption
2, a sufficient statistic for ∆σ20,t is the difference between mean and median growth. Hence,
3For CRRA utility (2) becomes cedet =
(∫
θ
c1−ηt (θ) dH (θ)
) 1
1−η
, the (1− η)−1 th moment of ct.
4Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the Atkinson inequality index is given by: I (η) = 1 − cedet
cpct
= 1 −
exp
(−η2σ2t ).
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(
gmedt − gpct
)
measures how much inequality has changed, and η scales this change to reflect
the welfare consequences for societal welfare growth. Growth of the median agent gedet
therefore determines the wealth-effect for an inequality-averse planner. Inserting gedet into
the Ramsey rule in (4) yields our simple inequality-adjusted SDR:
r∗ = δ + ηgpct + η
2
(
gmedt − gpct
)
(10)
The term η2
(
gmedt − gpct
)
is the inequality-adjustment to the wealth-effect in the SDR.
This scales the change in inequality,
(
gmedt − gpct
)
, in η2 because it multiplies inequality-
adjusted growth, which scales in η, by the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution. The latter is simply η in the discounted Utilitarian framework.5 The intuition
to our inequality-adjustment is clear: if growth is inequality-increasing then gmedt < g
pc
t ,
and an inequality averse society suffers a growth penalty which reduces the wealth-effect.
The opposite is true when inequality decreases and gmedt > g
pc
t . The size of the growth
penalty depends on the extent of inequality aversion, η.
An interesting special case is when we apply η = 1 to (6):
gedet =
1
t
(µt − µ0) = gmedt , (11)
Here the appropriate wealth-effect reflects the growth of median income, not the average
per-capita income: the agent with the median income becomes the representative agent.
4 Inequality adjustment in practice
Calibration of the inequality-adjusted SDR requires two components: a measure of societal
inequality aversion, and the growth of median incomes. Estimates of inequality-aversion,
η, vary from 0.8-2.0 (experiments on students), 0.4-2.5 (revealed in international transfers
or progressive tax systems), to 1-4 (elasticity of marginal utility using risk-aversion or
inter-temporal substitution) (Tol, 2010; Groom and Maddison, 2014). The UK Treasury
and the Stern Review argue for η = 1 (H.M. Treasury, 2003; Stern, 2007). Others argue
that, for normative reasons, η = 2 is a more suitable degree of inequality aversion (e.g.,
Dasgupta, 2008).
Taking the distribution into account when measuring national income has been a recom-
mendation that goes back decades (Sen, 1976). More recently the LSE growth commission
and the European Commission argued that “the median is better than the mean since it
is reflective of progress in the middle of the income distribution.” (Aghion et al., 2013;
5 It is possible to use Kreps-Porteus preferences to separate fluctuation and inequality aversion and
obtain a Ramsey-like formula: rt = δ + εg
ede
t , where ε is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution, see also Emmerling (2011).
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Figure 1: Household mean and median consumption growth in the U.S. (Source: Proctor
et al. (2016))
European Commission, 2014). This sentiment was echoed by the Stiglitz report (Stiglitz,
2012).
We apply our obtained formula for the SDR to a set of 256 countries and quantify the
inequality effect due to the difference between median and average growth. We use a
recently created dataset by Max Roser et al. (2016). In Figure 1, we computed the
growth rates of the average and median income per capita, using the longest available
time period available. Based on these growth rates, we compute the inequality adjusted
SDR for different countries and values of η.
In our sample of 25 countries, in 15 countries median growth fell short of average income,
while the reverse was true in 10 (mostly middle income) countries. Thus, the effect of
the inequality adjusted discount rate can go in both directions. In some high income
countries, such as the U.K. and U.S., the growth adjustment leads to a reduction of 1%
(0.5%, 0.25%) in the SDR for inequality aversion parameters of 2 (1, 0.5). For these
economies, future costs and benefits should be discounted at a lower rate as they fall on
more unequal, hence, from a social welfare perspective, worse-off generations.
6We include all countries of the original dataset of Max Roser et al. (2016) for which at least a time
series of ten years could be used to estimated the average growth rates.
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Table 1: Mean/Median growth rates and impact on SDR η2(gmed − gpc)
country period g pc g med η = 1 η = 2
Australia 1981-2010 1.61 1.45 -0.16 -0.62
Austria 1994-2004 1.07 1.20 0.13 0.52
Belgium 1985-2000 3.18 2.41 -0.77 -3.07
Canada 1981-2010 1.01 0.96 -0.04 -0.18
Czech Republic 1992-2010 3.28 3.10 -0.17 -0.69
Denmark 1987-2010 0.97 0.94 -0.03 -0.13
Estonia 2000-2010 5.69 6.38 0.69 2.76
Finland 1987-2010 1.95 1.70 -0.25 -1.02
France 1978-2010 1.13 1.28 0.14 0.57
Germany 1984-2010 0.89 0.83 -0.06 -0.25
Greece 1995-2010 2.07 2.32 0.25 1.00
Hungary 1991-2012 0.19 0.25 0.06 0.25
Ireland 1987-2010 3.61 3.73 0.12 0.48
Israel 1986-2010 1.93 1.79 -0.14 -0.57
Italy 1986-2010 1.27 1.26 -0.01 -0.03
Luxembourg 1985-2010 3.08 2.98 -0.11 -0.42
Netherlands 1993-2010 1.62 1.78 0.16 0.62
Norway 1979-2010 2.60 2.72 0.11 0.45
Poland 1992-2010 2.07 1.83 -0.23 -0.94
Slovak Republic 1992-2010 2.61 2.41 -0.20 -0.79
Slovenia 1997-2010 2.53 2.58 0.05 0.19
Spain 1980-2010 2.21 2.36 0.15 0.61
Sweden 1981-2005 1.89 1.68 -0.21 -0.85
United Kingdom 1979-2010 2.37 2.15 -0.22 -0.88
United States 1979-2013 0.77 0.49 -0.28 -1.11
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5 Conclusion
We develop a simple policy rule to allow CBA guidelines on discounting to take into ac-
count concerns about inequality in the evaluation of public projects. Under two simple
and defensible assumptions (isoelastic utility and log-normal income distribution) we de-
rive an ‘inequality-adjusted’ SDR that corrects the wealth effect for changes in inequality.
The adjustment to average (per capita) growth is simple to implement since it is propor-
tional to the difference between the growth of median and average incomes. The inequality
adjusted SDR is reduced if inequality is increasing so that median income growth lags
behind average growth, and vice versa.
Growth has been inequality increasing in some countries, and inequality reducing in oth-
ers. In the U.S., annual average (per capita) growth has been driven by growth in the
upper tail of the income distribution. Mean incomes grew at an annual rate of 1% since
1970, while the median income increased by only 0.3% per annum. Similar figures are
true for the UK. With an inequality aversion parameter of 1 (1.5, 2), the UK and U.S.
SDRs would be approximately 0.25% (0.5%, 1%) lower than the standard Ramsey rule.
The inequality adjustments to the SDR are therefore of consequence, indicating a higher
(lower) weight on future generations in countries where inequality is expected to rise (fall).
This outcome is particularly important for public policies and investments which have in-
tergenerational consequences. These include energy efficiency investments or regulations
that require the valuation of the social cost of carbon, the appraisal of nuclear power or
projects expected to deliver long-lived health outcomes such as the eradication of disease.
Our approach also provides a welfare theoretical basis for focussing on median incomes
as a measure of economic performance. In one plausible case, the agent with the median
income become the representative agent. Our inequality-adjusted growth rate therefore
has wider applications beyond discounting and CBA.
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